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[T]he privacy and dignity of our citizens [are] being whittled
away by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each
step may be of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole,
there begins to emerge a society quite unlike any we have seen -a society in which government may intrude into the secret
regions of a [person's] life at will.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

John Roe,2 until recently, was a police officer for the city of San Diego;
that is, until his supervising sergeant discovered that in his free time John
enjoyed stripping off a police uniform, masturbating in front of a video
camera, and selling the resulting pornography on eBay.3 Not surprisingly,
the San Diego Police Department (SDPD) demanded that John cease and
1

Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
2
"John Roe" is a fictitious name given to the plaintiff in the case of City
of San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521, 522 (2004) (per curiam). So that the
reader does not confuse San Diego v. Roe with the more well-known case of
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), this paper refers to the former as John
Roe.
3
See John Roe, 125 S.Ct. at 522.
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desist in producing or distributing any materials of a sexually explicit
nature, believing that such off-duty conduct not only violated a number of
internal police regulations, but also adversely impacted the SDPD's mission
and functions.4 When John did not completely cease his explicit
extracurricular activities as ordered, he was fired.5 In a per curiam decision
from the October 2004 term, the United States Supreme Court held that
John Roe was not denied his rights to free expression under the First
Amendment by the SDPD's actions, as he was not expressing himself on a
"matter of public concern."6
Putting aside the lurid nature of this case of the pornographic
policeman, John Roe raises significant constitutional questions regarding
the extent to which the government may condition public employment on
which activities employees decide to undertake in their private and personal
lives.7 Traditionally, under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the
Supreme Court has limited the government's ability to condition
governmental benefits, including public employment, on the basis of
individuals forfeiting their constitutional rights.8 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has most often applied the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to
scrutinize employment terminations of public employees for exercising
their First Amendment free speech rights.9
4

Id. at 522-523, 526.
Id. at 523.
6
Id. at 523-24.
7
The fact that the federal constitutional issues raised herein apply
directly only to public employment should in no way diminish the
significance of these legal issues. There are over 21 million federal, state,
and local government employees in the United States, who make up roughly
16.5% of the nation's workforce. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 298
(2004-2005) (Table No. 453) (figure from 2002); JOSEPH R. GRODIN, JUNE
M. WEISBERGER & MARTIN H. MALIN, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (2004).
8
See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-3
(2001).
9
See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972). Since Perry,
the Supreme Court has decided a number of these First Amendment public
employment cases. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); and Mt. Healthy City Bd.
of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
5
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In the First Amendment context, the Court has developed the wellhoned, if not entirely satisfactory, Connick/Pickering doctrinal analysis.
Taken together, Connick and Pickering forbid public employers from taking
adverse employment actions against employees for speaking out on "matters
of public concern," unless, under a constitutional balancing test, the
governmental interest in efficiency outweighs the employee's First
Amendment rights.10 Indeed, it was under this First Amendment analysis
that the Supreme Court dismissed John Roe's case against the SDPD.11
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lawrence v.
Texas,12 with its recognition of a more robust "liberty interest"13 in forming
one's identity through meaningful human relationships in one’s personal and
private life, has drastically altered the constitutional landscape as concerns
when the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions comes into play in the
public employment context. This is because, in Lawrence, the Supreme
10

See generally Connick, 461 U.S. at 143; and Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
11
See San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521, 526 (2004) (per curiam). Of
course, in John Roe, the Supreme Court did not need to engage in a
constitutional balancing act, as John's conduct did not meet the threshold
public concern test. See id.
12
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13
The focus on "liberty interests" rather than "privacy rights," is
consistent with the fact that Justice Kennedy utilizes the word "liberty"
much more in his opinion for the court than the more amorphous "privacy"
language. My guess is that his choice in this regard was purposeful as he
sought to anchor this newly-minted interest in the concrete liberty language
of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Accord Randy E.
Barnett, Correspondence, Grading Justice Kennedy: A Reply to Professor
Carpenter, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1589 (2005) ("The fact that Justice
Kennedy does not [announce a fundamental right to privacy]--that this
doctrinal dog does not bark--makes Lawrence in my view a 'potentially
revolutionary' liberty-protecting case."); and Erin Daly, The New Liberty,
11 WIDENER L. REV. 221, 233 (2005) ("Both Casey and Lawrence selfconsciously shift the focus of substantive due process away from privacy
and back toward its textual anchor, liberty. This avoids the principal
objection to the Court's post-Griswold privacy jurisprudence-that it lacks
textual support."). See also Note, Unfixing Lawrence, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2858, 2868 (2005) (arguing that there "is a strategic equivocation between
privacy and liberty," in Lawrence to advance, "whether knowingly or not, . .
.a strategically powerful complex. The two terms of the complex sustain
and limit one another.").
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Court construed an individual’s liberty interest in decisional noninterference in private affairs14 as a heightened one due a more searching
form of rational basis review.15 Consequently, a previously neglected
aspect of Lawrence is that it almost certainly trumpets the beginning of a
new era of greater privacy protection for public employees, as adverse
employment actions taken against them on the basis of their decisions about
their private affairs will be subject to a more searching scrutiny.
This paper therefore argues that Lawrence signals the fulfillment of a
certain constitutional tradition initiated by Justice Brandeis in his eloquent
dissent in Olmstead v. United States,16 most recently revived in the joint
opinion of three Justices in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,17 and, for the first time, adopted by a majority of the
Court in Lawrence.18 In short, post-Lawrence, the government employer
can no longer terminate an employee merely because that employee does
not live up to the employer's conception of morality in how she lives her
private and personal life (especially in matters pertaining to sex).19
Because the current Connick/Pickering framework has been molded to
apply to the First Amendment framework, which focuses on the nature of
14

See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (“Decisional interference involves the government’s
incursion into people’s decisions regarding their private affairs.”) (emphasis
in original) (on file with author); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599-600 (1977) (finding one form of privacy consisting of the “interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”).
15
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. Although not every jurist and
commentator agrees that Lawrence applies more than a traditional rational
basis review to rights of decisional non-interference in private affairs, the
vast majority does. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence
v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV.
1011, 1032 (2005) ("[F]ew constitutional scholars think the narrowest or the
broadest reading of Lawrence is correct. Its charged reasoning cannot be
limited to the sodomy context alone, but neither does it entail same-sex
marriage.").
16
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint opinion).
18
539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
19
Id. at 572 (observing the “emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22,
34-35 (Kan. 2005) (finding, based on Lawrence, that moral disapproval of a
group cannot be a legitimate government interest).
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the speech or expression engaged in by the employee, it cannot readily be
applied to the Lawrence substantive due process context and needs
reworking to protect these new constitutional interests. Consequently, this
article proposes an original constitutional balancing analysis, the modified
Pickering analysis, to more appropriately weigh a public employee's interest
in decisional non-interference in private affairs against the employer's
interest in running an efficient governmental service.20
In order to concretely demonstrate how the modified Pickering analysis
will apply to the liberty interests announced in Lawrence, this paper revisits
the Supreme Court’s decision in City of San Diego v. Roe. While this paper
concludes that the outcome of John Roe would most likely have been
decided in the same manner under this modified analysis because of
heightened governmental efficiency concerns and the relatively minimal
substantive due process rights of John Roe under the circumstances;21
nevertheless, the more important point is that the appropriate form of
constitutional balancing of relevant interests in future substantive due
process cases will certainly lead to public employees having greater legal
protection from arbitrary interference by government employers into their
private affairs.22
This article presents the emergence of these post-Lawrence public
employee interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs, and the
concomitant modified Pickering test, in five parts. Part II will discuss the
historical foundations of the Supreme Court’s maddening doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions and, in particular, the unique character of those
unconstitutional conditions cases in which the government acts in its
capacity as an employer. Part III will then review the development of
substantive due process jurisprudence in the privacy context over the last
century and describe how Lawrence v. Texas represents the fulfillment of an
expansive view of these constitutional rights in the form of the interest in
decisional non-interference in private affairs.
Based on this new
constitutional development, Part IV will next propose a modified version of
the Pickering test, which simultaneously discards the Connick public
20

To be clear, although this new test is denominated the "modified
Pickering analysis," this test is not meant to apply to First Amendment
public employee disputes. For those cases, the Connick/Pickering line still
applies; this modified analysis is only for weighing public employees'
substantive due process rights post-Lawrence against an employers'
efficiency concerns. It is because of the constitutional balancing analysis
set up in Pickering that this new test has been so named.
21
See infra Part V.A.2.
22
See infra Part V.B.
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concern test and more appropriately, from the start, weighs public
employees’ interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs against
government employers' efficiency concerns. Finally, in an attempt to
discern the analytical strengths and weaknesses of this new test, Part V will
apply the modified Pickering analysis to the John Roe case and some real
world public employee cases and hypothetical scenarios.
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT

To begin to understand the inadequacy of the existing unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in public employment with regard to the substantive due
process rights of public employees post-Lawrence, it is first necessary to
explore the legal boundaries of the current doctrine. The following three
sections undertake a brief analysis of the historical foundations of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, then analyze the Connick/Pickering
line of public employee free speech cases, and finally highlight the peculiar
lack of unconstitutional conditions in employment cases outside of the First
Amendment.
A.

A Brief Introduction to the Historical Foundations of the Doctrine

Historically, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions first
enjoyed widespread use in the early part of the 20th century when the
Lochner Court23 developed economic substantive due process.24 Under
economic substantive due process, the Lochner Court emphasized property
23

See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (utilizing a
substantive due process analysis to strike down maximum hour laws for
bakers because of its "arbitrary interference with the right of the individual
to personal liberty."), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
706 (1963), and Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
24
The Lochner Court constitutionalized property rights and the liberty
to contract under a theory of economic substantive due process, as a means
to strike down much social welfare legislation during the first part of the
20th century. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)
(invalidating a federal law prohibiting interstate carriers from terminating
workers for union membership), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). For a comprehensive analysis of the various
meanings ascribed to the Lochnerian Era, see generally Sujit Choudhry, The
Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 1
(2004).
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rights and the freedom to contract.25 During the zenith of this period, the
Court held that states could not condition corporate privileges upon the
forfeiture of economic substantive due process rights.26 This limitation on
the government's ability to use its various powers to limit individual's
constitutional rights was really in hindsight the first incarnation of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
But with the "switch in time that saved nine"27 and the ascendancy of
President Roosevelt's New Deal Court in the late 1930's and early 1940's,
the Lochner era came to an abrupt halt.28 In the ensuing period, a new
Supreme Court abolished much of the Lochner Court's economic
substantive due process jurisprudence and, as a result, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions itself went through a substantial period of
disuse.29 Shortly thereafter, however, the Warren Court of the 1950s and
1960s rescued the doctrine from the dustbin of legal history and began to
apply it to a number of cases involving civil rights and civil liberties.30
25

See, e.g., Adair, 208 U.S. 161 (invalidating a federal law prohibiting
interstate carriers from terminating workers for union membership);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down a Kansas statute that
prohibited employers from conditioning employment on the employee's
agreement to refrain from joining a labor organization); Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a minimum wage
law for women).
26
Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and
the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 104 n.7 (1988)
("[Unconstitutional conditions first] appear in Justice Bradley's dissent in
Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876): 'Though a State
may have the power, if it sees fit to subject its citizens to the inconvenience,
of prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business within its
jurisdiction, it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon
their doing so.' Id. at 543 (Bradley, J., dissenting).").
27
See William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L.
REV. 579, 593-94 (2004) (quoting FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 393 (1993)).
28
Indeed, Lochner itself was eventually "implicitly rejected." See
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977). See also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("We do not sit as a super-legislature
to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic
problems, business affairs, or social conditions.").
29
See Kathleen A. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413, 1416 (1989).
30
See Epstein, supra note 26, at 104.
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Many of these more recent unconstitutional conditions cases have
involved the government acting in its role as a sovereign,31 seeking to
induce certain preferred outcomes through use of government subsidies and
tax exemptions.32 In these "government subsidy" cases, the government
seeks to utilize its Spending Clause Power33 to award government largesse
to individuals in return for their agreeing to significant burdens on their
"preferred rights," especially their rights to speech, expression, and
association under the First Amendment.34
The Supreme Court has responded to this aggressive use of Congress'
Spending Clause Power by reinvigorating the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. While not anchored in any single clause of the Federal
Constitution, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been called a
"creature of judicial implication."35 In its simplest terms, the modern form
of the doctrine prohibits the government from conditioning a governmental
benefit based on an individual’s forfeiting a constitutional right under
certain circumstances.36 Although what the unconstitutional conditions
31

As will be discussed in detail below, government can either act in its
sovereign or employer capacity. See infra Part II.B.1.
32
See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960); and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
33
The Spending Clause of the United States Constitution states: "The
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Congress
is allowed to provide incentives under its Spending Clause Powers, but it
may not coerce federal funding recipients through this power. See South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) ("[Congress may not induce the
recipient of federal funding] to engage in activities that would themselves
be unconstitutional.").
34
A considerable amount of dissonance exists between two different
groups of Justices, and indeed there are two different schools of
jurisprudential thought concerning the application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in these so-called "government subsidy" cases. See
Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1415-16 (noting the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions is "a minefield to be traversed gingerly," and "riven with
inconsistencies"). Fortunately, this debate does not arise in employment
cases and is, therefore, beyond the scope of this article. For an in-depth
discussion of these cases, see generally Sullivan, supra note 29; and
Berman, supra note 8.
35
See Epstein, supra note 26, at 10.
36
See Berman, supra note 8, at 3 ("[I]t is now universally recognized
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doctrine holds is generally uncontested, specifying the "certain
circumstances" under which the doctrine is thought to apply is a completely
different story.37
For instance, Dean Sullivan attempts to limit the doctrine to incursions
into "preferred rights."38 Professor Berman, for his part, believes that this is
an unhelpful distinction because there is generally much disagreement over
what should and should not be a preferred right.39 Regardless, this paper
follows Sullivan's "conventional formulation" regarding the scope of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Indeed, a cursory survey of the
different types of cases in which the doctrine has been applied over the
years appears to track mostly instances involving arguably "preferred"
rights.40 For instance, the doctrine has been applied to First Amendment
that [governmental] conditional offers are sometimes constitutionally
permissible and sometimes not. Indeed, correctly understood, that is all the
famed and contentious unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds."). See
also Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1421-22 ("Unconstitutional conditions
problems arise when government offers a benefit on condition that the
recipient perform or forego an activity that a preferred constitutional right
normally protects from government interference."). According to Berman,
another way of understating the doctrine is to recognize that the
government's power to withhold a benefit entirely does not always permit it
to offer the benefit conditionally. See Berman, supra note 8, at 18-19.
37
See Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative
Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1984) (observing
that unconstitutional conditions decisions "manifest[] an inconsistency so
marked as to make a legal realist of almost any reader.").
38
See Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1421-22. For Sullivan, “preferred
constitutional rights” refer to rights normally protected by strict judicial
review. Id. at 1427.
39
See Berman, supra note 8, at 9-10 (“[U]nder Dean Sullivan's
formulation--the conventional formulation--the question of whether this
liberty interest rises to a constitutional right (or, as she puts it, a "preferred"
constitutional right) determines not only whether the condition is
unconstitutional, but whether the law even presents an unconstitutional
conditions problem. This is unfortunate, for whether a preferred right is
involved may prove controversial or uncertain . . . . "[P]referred rights" . . .
do not come to our attention predefined.") (parentheses and quotations in
original).
40
It is true that Sullivan limits her theory "normally" to rights which
receive strict scrutiny, see Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1427, but there does
not appear to be any sound reason to differentiate between different forms
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cases involving tax exemptions,41 users of public facilities,42 recipients of
government subsidies,43 and government employees,44 and to Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment cases involving property takings and just
compensation.45
All that being said, the legal context in which the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions has been applied the most often is public
employment.
As Jason Mazzone has aptly pointed out, "[p]ublic
employment . . . represents a constant opportunity for the government to
persuade individuals to give up certain First Amendment protections in
exchange for a regular paycheck."46 It is thus to a more detailed discussion
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public employment that this
paper now turns.
of heightened scrutiny in the unconstitutional conditions context. This is
not to say there are not meaningful distinctions between “mere liberty
interests” protected by rational basis review and “constitutional rights”
protected by some form of heightened scrutiny, or even perhaps between
“non-preferred rights” that get some form of heightened review and
“preferred rights” which are due strict judicial review. Rather, assuming
one accepts that the constitutional right involved is due some form of
heightened review, it is unimportant for the sake of the unconstitutional
conditions analysis whether that right is subject to "rational review with
bite," see Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence's Quintessential Millian Moment and
Its Impact on the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 50 VILL. L. REV.
117, 133-136 (2005), intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny. That is, the
relevant inquiry is whether the particular liberty interest is sufficiently
important to the individual as to place on the government a demand for
heightened justification before it interferes with that interest. Accord Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[The liberty of
the due process clause] . . . recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of
the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.").
41
See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
42
E.g. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993); and Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
43
E.g. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
44
See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); and Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
45
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); and Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
46
Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 810
(2003).
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Unconstitutional Conditions in Public Employment and the First
Amendment

As an initial matter, in unconstitutional conditions in employment cases,
the government has much more leeway in interfering with individual rights
than it does when acting in the subsidy context described in the previous
section.47 As a result, individuals in these employment cases generally have
lesser speech and expression protections under the First Amendment.48 To
more fully understand why this state of affairs exists in the constitutional
public employment context, this Section proceeds by first discussing the
unique status of the government when it acts in its employer capacity and
then next considers how this unique status has been traditionally recognized
by the Supreme Court through the development and implementation of its
Connick/Pickering First Amendment analysis.
1. The Unique Status of Government as Employer
Although most jurists once believed that government benefits, including
public employment, were mere privileges that could be withheld or limited
on any condition,49 the Supreme Court has now emphatically rejected "the
greater includes the lesser" premise.50 For instance, in the landmark public
employment case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court
stated: "'[T]he theory that public employment which may be denied
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how

47

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1069 (2d ed. 2002).
48
See Eugene Volokh, Symposium, Intermediate Questions of Religious
Exemptions -- A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.
595, 635 (1999) ("Under free speech law, the government acting as
employer has far more authority to restrict people's speech than does the
government acting as sovereign.").
49
While a judge on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Oliver Wendell Holmes once famously said that, in the employment
context, a person "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
50
See Mazzone, supra note 46, at 806 ("The doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions rejects the notion that the government's power to grant a benefit
includes the lesser power to attach any conditions at all to receiving that
benefit.").
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unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.'"51 Thus, the government "may
not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests -- especially, his interest in freedom of speech."52 As the
Court in Perry v. Sindermann aptly explained: "For if the government could
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech
or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized
and inhibited,"53 and "'produce a result which (it) could not command
directly.'"54
Nevertheless, the public employer has been found to have more latitude
when setting the terms and conditions of its employees' employment, a
discretion which would not be available in its dealing with the same
individuals as citizens. In this regard, Justice Marshall famously stated in
Pickering v. Bd. of Education: "[I]t cannot be gainsaid that the State has
interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the
speech of the citizenry in general."55 Although Justice Marshall in
Pickering did not expressly support his assertion, the Supreme Court on
numerous occasions has since re-affirmed that government has significantly
more authority over individuals when wearing acting in its employment
capacity.56
51

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589,
605-06 (1967) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239
(2d Cir. 1965)). See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)
("For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a
person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are
some reasons upon which the government may not rely."); and Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("It is too late in the day to doubt that the
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or
placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.").
52
See Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597.
53
Id.
54
Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
55
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (emphasis
added). See also Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The restrictions that the Constitution places upon
the government in its capacity as lawmaker, i.e., as the regulator of private
conduct, are not the same as the restrictions it places upon the government
in its capacity as employer.").
56
See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1994) (plurality
opinion) ("We have never explicitly answered this question [about the
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For example, in her opinion for the Court in Board of County
Commissioners v. Umbehr,57 Justice O'Connor explained that, "[t]he
government needs to be free to terminate both employees and contractors
for poor performance, to improve the efficiency, efficacy, and
responsiveness of service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of
corruption."58 In a similar vein, Justice Powell explained in his concurring
opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy that, "the Government's interest is the
maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline . . . To this end, the
Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over
the management of its personnel and internal affairs."59 Finally, in Waters
government's dual roles,] though we have always assumed that its premise
is correct -- that the government as employer indeed has far broader powers
that does the government as sovereign.") (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568;
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564
(1973); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); and Bd. of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v Grumet, 512 US 687, 718 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("We have ... no one Free Speech Clause test. We have
different tests for content-based speech restrictions, for content-neutral
speech restrictions, for restrictions imposed by the government acting as
employer, for restrictions in nonpublic fora, and so on.")).
57
518 U.S. 668 (1996).
58
Id. at 674; see also Waters, 511 U.S. at 674-75 (plurality opinion)
(“[T]he extra power the government has [as employer] comes from the
nature of the government's mission as employer. Government agencies are
charged by law with doing particular tasks. Agencies hire employees to
help do those tasks as effectively and efficiently as possible. When someone
who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to the agency's effective
operation begins to do or say things that detract from the agency's effective
operation, the government employer must have some power to restrain
her.”). See also Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative
Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1250 (1999) ("The government
has instrumental or programmatic goals within the domain of management.
When acting there, it may restrict individual autonomy in the service of its
programmatic goals.") (citing C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and
Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16-21 (1998)). Indeed, absent
contractual, statutory or constitutional restriction, the government is entitled
to terminate employees and contractors on an at-will basis, for good reason,
bad reason, or no reason at all. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674.
59
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
If it were otherwise, Justice Powell explains, the government employer
would not be able to remove inefficient and unsatisfactory workers quickly,
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v. Churchill, Justice O'Connor further distinguished the two differing roles
that government undertakes by explaining that not only can certain First
Amendment doctrines not reasonably be applied to the speech of
government employees,60 but also by pointing to the fact that less stringent
procedural requirements appertain to restrictions on government employees'
speech.61
Nevertheless, while it is generally agreed that the government has more
power to interfere with individuals' constitutional rights in its employment
capacity,62 it is has been difficult to give dimension to the exact amount of
disruption employee speech or conduct must cause before the government
employer can intervene.63 The next section turns to this difficult question.
2.

The First Amendment Speech and Expression Rights of Public
Employees: The Connick/Pickering Analysis

To determine whether the government employer is acting in a
"reasonable" manner, and consistent with other constitutional contexts
involving "reasonableness" tests,64 the Supreme Court has engaged in a
and the government's substantial interest in so doing would be frustrated
without adequate justification. Id.
60
See Waters, 511 U.S. at 672 (plurality opinion) (reviewing a number
of First Amendment doctrines that do not apply with the same force in the
government as employer context, including instances in which the employer
"may bar its employees from using Mr. Cohen's offensive utterance to
members of the public or to the people with whom they work.") (citing
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971)).
61
See id. at 673 (observing that although speech restrictions on private
citizens must precisely define the speech they target, a government
employer is permitted to prohibit its employees from acting "rude to
customers," even though this restriction would be void for vagueness under
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence); see also Volokh, supra note
48, at 635.
62
See Waters, 511 U.S. at 673 (observing that the Court has
"consistently given greater deference to government predictions of harm
used to justify restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm
used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large.").
63
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) (noting the difficulty
associated with the Pickering balance).
64
See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342-43 (1985)
(balancing test utilized to show reasonableness in Fourth Amendment
government search of public school student's purse); see also infra Part
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constitutional balancing act.65 In this regard, Justice Marshall set forth the
applicable test in Pickering: "The problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the [public employee], as citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees."66 This principle applies regardless of the public
employee's contractual or other claims to a job.67
Important considerations in carrying out this balance include whether
the employee's statements would impair discipline by superiors, harmony
among co-workers, close working relationships for which personal loyalty
and confidence are necessary, the performance of the employee's duties, or
the regular operation of the enterprise.68 In Pickering, for instance, the
balancing came out in favor of the public school teacher since the statement
concerned a matter of public concern (i.e., whether the school system
required additional funds), and there was no evidence that the statement
disrupted the employee's relationship with co-workers, his own job duties,
or with the operation of the school in general.69 In such instances, the
Court found that, "it is necessary to regard the [public employee] as the
member of the general public he seeks to be."70
The Pickering balancing test, however, was given an important, and

IV.B.2 (discussing in detail the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test as
applied to government employees).
65
See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996).
66
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
67
See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). In this sense,
First Amendment claims based on the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions are distinct from procedural due process claims which depend on
whether the public employee is thought to have a liberty or property interest
in his or her employment. See id. at 599.
68
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering,
391 U.S. at 570-73).
69
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72. The Court also noted the import of
allowing public employees to speak out on matters of public concern since
they are many times in the best position to have "informed and definite
opinions." See id. at 572.
70
See id. at 574. Of course, regarding the public employee "as the
member of the general public he seeks to be," does not mean that
government employees qualify for the more stringent protections that apply
to citizens when the government acts in its sovereign capacity. See supra
Part II.B.1.
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ambiguous, gloss in 1983 in the case of Connick v. Myers.71 Although the
phrasing, "a matter of public concern" was included in the Court's
formulation in Pickering,72 Connick elaborated upon what counts as "a
matter of public concern."73 In Connick, an assistant district attorney had
circulated to co-workers a questionnaire concerning internal office affairs in
order to discover whether there was a general job satisfaction problem in
the New Orleans District Attorney's office.74 Emphasizing "the common
sense realization that government offices could not function if every
employment decision became a constitutional matter,"75 the Court ruled that
even before a Pickering balance could occur, a court had to consider as a
threshold matter whether the public employee was speaking on a “matter of
public concern.”76 The Court made the public concern test the center of
this crucial inquiry based on its belief that all previous unconstitutional
conditions in employment cases centered on “the rights of public employees
to participate in public affairs.”77 Because the Court concluded that most of
the questionnaire concerned matters of "private interest," rather than "public
concern,"78 it dismissed most of the plaintiff's First Amendment claim at
71

461 U.S. 138 (1983).
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
73
See Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to
Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L. J. 43, 47-50
(1988).
74
Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41.
75
Id. at 143.
76
Id. at 146 ("Pickering, its antecedents and progeny, lead us to
conclude that if [the] questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as
constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to
scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.").
77
Id. at 144-45. Justice White explained for the majority that, "When
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials
should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Id. at 146.
78
Id. at 154. The Court went out of its way to emphasize that public
employee speech on private matters does not constitute unprotected speech
such as obscenity or fighting words. See id. at 147. Nevertheless, "when a
public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in
which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public
agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior." Id.
72
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this threshold level.79
While Connick explained the centrality of the public concern test to the
public employee free speech analysis, it provided little guidance as to how
to draw the lines between what is "a matter of public concern" and what is a
"matter of private interest."80 All that Connick stated in this regard was
that, "[w]hether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern
must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement,
as revealed by the whole record."81 Consequently, Connick has left us with
"tenuous determinations about which matters are of public concern and ad
hoc, case-by- case balancing of governmental efficiency interests against
employee speech interests."82
79

Id. at 154. As for the one question on the questionnaire which could
be characterized as a matter of public concern, the Court found that because
of the disruptive effect of this question on the workplace, the Pickering
balance came out in favor of the government. Id. As Randy Kozel has aptly
commented, this disruption theory of public employee speech is unsettling
because "[s]uch a test is inconsistent with the notion of robust exchange of
divergent ideas, as it leaves vulnerable the speech that is most likely to have
a strong effect." See Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee
Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1018 (2005).
80
One issue that has been decided about the public concern test since
Connick, however, is that a statement made by a public employee in a
private conversation criticizing a political official may still be considered
speech on a matter of "public" concern. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378, 386-7 (1987); see also Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch.
Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979) (holding that a public employee may
express her views in private to an employer and still be protected by the
First Amendment).
81
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
82
Kozel, supra note 79, at 1017. It is therefore not surprising that a
veritable cottage industry of academic literature has attempted to make
sense of this amorphous, unsatisfying test. See, e.g., id. at 1044-51 (putting
forth an internal/external model of public employee speech to replace
current Connick/Pickering approach); Allred, supra note 73, at 75-81
(describing the conflict and confusion surrounding the public concern test
and proposing an alternative standard); Paul Cerkvenik, Note, Who Your
Friends Are Could Get You Fired! The Connick "Public Concern" Test
Unjustifiably Restricts Public Employees' Associational Rights, 79 MINN. L.
REV. 425, 445 (1994) (discussing confusion surrounding whether the public
concern test applies to public employee freedom of association cases);
Karin B. Hoppmann, Note, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a Better
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Nevertheless, it appears that the substantial legal hurdles imposed by
Connick become much more manageable for public employees in a sub-set
of cases in which the employee speech is completely unrelated to his or her
public employment and is spoken on the employee's own time, but still
qualifies as a matter of public concern.83 In United States v. National
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU),84 the federal government passed a law
prohibiting federal employees from receiving honoraria for making
speeches or writing articles.85 Significantly, the prohibition applied even
though the subject of the article did not have any connection to the
government employee’s employment.86
Definition of the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993,
996 (1997) (stating that the Connick Court failed to supply a clear definition
of public concern and that the test is flawed); Kermit Roosevelt III, Note,
The Costs of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and the First Amendment in the
Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233, 1241 (1997) (criticizing the
vagueness of the public concern test); and D. Gordon Smith, Comment,
Beyond "Public Concern": New Free Speech Standards for Public
Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 255-64 (1990) (contending that
problems surrounding the public concern test have led to undue restriction
of the free speech rights of public employees). Additionally, the Supreme
Court has slated for argument yet another case for the October 2005 Term
dealing with this enigmatic issue. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 361 F.3d 1168
(9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1395 (Feb. 25, 2005) (posing the
question of whether a public employee's purely job-related speech should be
cloaked with First Amendment protection if it touches upon a matter of
public concern).
83
Indeed, as early as Connick, the Court recognized that different
factors might be at play when the public employee speech involves offduty, non-work related activities. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 153 n.13 (citing
NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974)).
84
513 U.S. 454 (1995).
85
Id. at 457.
86
Id. Examples of the plaintiffs’ speeches in this case include a mail
handler who wanted to give lectures on the Quaker religion, an aerospace
engineer who lectured on black history, and a microbiologist who wrote
articles on dance performances. See id. at 461-62. Importantly, the Court
noted that these federal employees sought compensation for their expressive
activities in their capacity as citizens, not as government employees, and
these activities did not have any adverse impact on the efficiency of the
offices in which they worked. Id. at 465 ("Neither the character of the
authors, the subject matter of their expression, the effect of the content of

20

Paul M. Secunda

[31-Jan-06

Finding that the federal employees' expressive activities fell within the
category of comment on matters of public concern,87 the Court was able to
conclude easily under Pickering that the employees' interests outweighed
those of the government.88 More interestingly, the Court appears to be
saying that even when speech is completely unrelated to a public
employee's job, the public concern test is still the appropriate test to apply.89
their expression on their official duties, nor the kind of audiences they
address have any relevance to their employment.").
87
See id. at 466 ("Respondents' expressive activities in this case fall
within the protected category of citizen comment on matters of public
concern rather than employee comment on matters related to personal status
in the workplace. The speeches and articles for which they received
compensation in the past were addressed to a public audience, were made
outside the workplace, and involved content largely unrelated to their
government employment."). Interestingly, the dichotomy seemingly set up
by the Court in NTEU does not contemplate whether a government
employer can fire an employee for engaging in conduct outside of work not
addressed to a public audience and not on matters of public concern, such as
the situation where a public employee is fired for writing poetry on their
own time. A literal reading of Connick and NTEU would suggest that the
poetry-writing employee would have no constitutional protection, a
seemingly absurd result. Such an employee might be protected, however,
under the proposed modified Pickering test for post-Lawrence substantive
due process rights. See infra discussion Parts IV.B, V.B. (The author
particularly wishes to thank Mitch Berman for his insights on the issues
discussed in this footnote).
88
Furthermore, when Congress seeks to deter in a wholesale fashion a
broad category of expression, the burden on the government will be
especially heavy. See id. at 467; see also id. at 468 ("The widespread
impact of the honoraria ban . . . gives rise to far more serious concerns than
could any single supervisory decision."). The Court also found that a
prohibition on compensation for speech, rather than on the speech itself,
could cause just as much of a burden on an employee's expressive activity.
See id. at 468.
89
Accord Kozel, supra note 79, at 1050-51 (observing that when the
employee speech in question includes "indicia of the speaker's employment,
the proper analytical rubric [is] the familiar Connick/Pickering two- step).
See also NTEU, 513 U.S. at 480 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
("The time-tested Pickering balance . . . provides the governing framework
for analysis of all manner of restrictions on speech by the government as
employer.").
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In other words, even when a public employee is acting in her capacity as a
citizen, under the First Amendment analysis, that employee is still treated as
a government employee if the speech restriction is predicated upon the
individual's public employment.90
C.

The Peculiar Lack of Unconstitutional Conditions In Employment
Cases Outside of the First Amendment

As can be gathered from the intricate legal analysis described above, the
Supreme Court has spent a substantial amount of time working out the
contours of the First Amendment speech rights of public employees. The
same cannot be said of the parameters of public employees' constitutional
rights outside of the First Amendment. Although such cases do exist (most
at the lower federal court level with one exception),91 the Court continues to
90

A possible alternative view would have permitted the employee, when
speaking as a citizen, to take advantage of the more stringent protections of
the traditional First Amendment analysis. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 157
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("When public employees engage in expression
unrelated to their employment while away from the work place, their First
Amendment rights are, of course, no different from those of the general
public.").
91
See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976) (upholding hair
length regulations for police officers under substantive due process, noting,
"If such state regulations may survive challenges based on the explicit
language of the First Amendment, there is surely even more room for
restrictive regulations of state employees where the claim implicates only
the more general contours of the substantive liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."). Many more of these cases have percolated
through the lower federal courts throughout the years, without much success
for public employee plaintiffs. See, e.g., Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d
1030, 1040-41 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that anti-fraternization rule not
allowing prison employees to associate with offenders off-duty did not
violate employee's freedom of intimate association); Shahar v. Bowers, 114
F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir. 1997) (rehearing en banc) (upholding discharge
of staff attorney of the Georgia Department of Law who was fired when
employer learned of planned homosexual marriage ceremony); Rathert v.
Vill. of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 515 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that prohibiting
police officers from wearing earring off-duty rationally related to
permissible purpose). See also Steve Hartsoe, ACLU Challenges N.C.
Cohabitation Law, WASH. POST, May 10, 2005, at A06 (describing ACLU
lawsuit filed against Pender County, North Carolina for forcing a sheriff
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apply mostly the government-as-employer analysis in the First Amendment
context.92
Of the few cases that do exist, some have been highlighted by Justice
Scalia in his dissent in Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., a political
affiliation case.93 For instance, in the Fourth Amendment context, Justice
Scalia noted that although private citizens were not subjected to
governmental searches and seizures of their property without a warrant
supported by probable cause, government employees, in many
circumstances, may have their property searched without violating the
Fourth Amendment.94 Additionally, governmental entities may more easily
conduct drug testing of public employees who are engaged in safety
sensitive or confidential positions.95 This is because "in certain limited
circumstances, the Government's need to discover such latent or hidden
conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to
justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches
without any measure of individualized suspicion."96 Scalia also noted in his
Rutan dissent that, in the Fifth Amendment context, private citizens cannot
be forced to provide the government with information that incriminates
them, but government employees can be dismissed from employment when
the incriminating information in question is related to the performance of

dispatcher to quit her job for violating state's "adultery and fornication"
law).
92
See Mazzone, supra note 46, at 810 (noting that, "[t]he doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions has been most vigorously applied in First
Amendment cases.").
93
See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976)
(upholding a hair grooming regulation for police under substantive due
process finding a clear rational connection between the regulation and the
promotion of safety of persons and property)).
94
See id. (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987)
(plurality opinion)).
95
See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 667-668 (1989) (permitting drug testing of federal custom agents who
interdict drugs or carry weapons); and Knox County Educ. Ass’n. v. Knox
County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 384 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding a policy
of suspicionless drug testing for all individuals who apply for, transfer to, or
are promoted to, "safety sensitive" positions within a school system,
including teaching positions).
96
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
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their jobs.97 Finally, in the substantive due process area pre-Lawrence,
public employers historically could regulate such things as their police
officers' grooming practices.98
Although some public employment cases involving interests under the
substantive due process clause have been argued at the lower federal court
level,99 mostly absent from Supreme Court jurisprudence is any mention of
the relationship between public employment and interests under substantive
due process.100 The lack of unconstitutional conditions in employment
cases outside of the First Amendment is puzzling, but will perhaps become
an anachronism with the additional emphasis being placed on interests in
decisional autonomy in light of Lawrence v. Texas.101
Consistent with this line of thought, the next section argues that recent
developments in substantive due process law, ushered in by the Supreme
Court's decision in Lawrence, should lead to a new approach to
unconstitutional conditions cases involving the interests of public
employees in decisional non-interference in private affairs. It is to that task
that this paper now turns.

97

See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 94-95 (citing Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S.
273, 277-78 (1968)).
98
See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 247.
99
See supra note 91.
100
Although Kelley v. Johnson did involve the application of
substantive due process to an unconstitutional condition in public
employment case, see supra note 20, it only applied a pre-Lawrence,
traditional rational basis review analysis. See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 247-48.
In fact, the Supreme Court failed to grant certiorari in two cases concerning
the right to decisional non-interference in private affairs in the early 1980s.
See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio,
470 U.S. 1009, 1011 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (describing case upholding the firing of a public high school
teacher who was fired for the mere fact of being bisexual); and Whisenhunt
v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 971 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (discussing case upholding the firing of male police sergeant
and female patrol office for engaging together in a romantic relationship).
101
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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LAWRENCE AND THE RIGHT TO DECISIONAL NON-INTERFERENCE IN
PRIVATE AFFAIRS

A. The Various Incomplete Incarnations of the Right to Decisional NonInterference Prior to Lawrence v. Texas
Since Brandeis and Warren wrote their famous article in 1890 about
privacy rights,102 the only thing that commentators seem to agree on
concerning the right to privacy is that there is very little agreement about its
contours.103 It is not my goal here to suggest a theory or taxonomy of
privacy.104 Rather, this section discusses the interest in decisional noninterference in private affairs, and the various labels and methods which
courts have utilized to protect these decisional autonomy rights prior to
Lawrence.105 Specifically, this section categorizes the various approaches
to decisional non-interference as part of the jurisprudences of: (1) the right
to be let alone; (2) the right to personhood; and (3) the right to intimacy or
intimate association.
1. The Right to Be Let Alone
The place to start this discussion, as always, must be with the seminal
Brandeis and Warren article,106 for prior to this time the Court only
recognized constitutional privacy rights stemming directly from concrete
and explicit constitutional provisions that addressed privacy concerns in
102

See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
103
See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1087, 1099-1124 (2002) (cataloging the different conceptions of privacy
that various courts and commentators have championed).
104
For a recent attempt at a pragmatic theory of privacy, see, e.g,, id. at
1090-1091 (developing a theory of privacy based on Wittgenstein's notion
of "family resemblance").
105
Here, I rely upon Solove's taxonomy for privacy for the different
types of decisional non-interference. See id. at 1092; see also Solove, supra
note 14, at 54-57 (under this more recent contextual taxonomy offered by
Solove, a violation of these type of "privacy rights" would be referred to as
"decisional interference in private affairs"). Each of these categories,
however, is not mutually exclusive and relies upon one another to varying
degree under difference conceptions of privacy. See Solove, supra note
103, at 1116.
106
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102.
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particular contexts,107 and then only rarely. Brandeis and Warren talked of
privacy generally as "a right to be let alone" by the government.108 To
them, and to us today no less, there was a sphere of personal autonomy or
"personality" upon which the government should not be able to tread
arbitrarily.109 Of course, this very idea of the unencumbered individual
sprang directly from more generic forms of classical liberalism.110 In turn,
107

Such individual constitutional provisions recognized prior to 1890
included the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures under
the Fourth Amendment, and the right not to be forced to incriminate oneself
under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
633 (1886):
For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the
fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of
compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in
criminal cases is condemned in the fifth amendment; and
compelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself,' which is condemned in the fifth amendment, throws light
on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure'
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
108
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 193. Although the
Supreme Court utilized this definition of privacy a number of times shortly
after the article, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
(concerning the right to bodily integrity with regard to a compulsory
vaccination law); and Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891) (stating that a person had the right to be let alone where the issue
was whether a plaintiff could be forced to undergo a surgical examination),
the references to a "right to be let alone" in Supreme Court jurisprudence
were relatively rare until after the Second World War.
109
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 106, at 205-206 (noting that
privacy was based on the principle "of inviolate personality" and that there
is "a general right to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and sensations"); and
Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1052 (contending that American life is animated
by a presumptive libertarian mentality: "Libertarian is the presumption that
the state leaves us alone to choose our own path to happiness."). See also
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (holding that individuals have
the “fundamental . . . right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”).
110
By classical liberalism, I simply mean a political philosophy which
endorses a conception of liberty as the absence of interference. See Isaiah
Berlin, Inaugural Address Before the University of Oxford (Oct. 31, 1958),
in ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY, IN LIBERALISM AND ITS
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classical liberalism finds its root in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty111 and its
most vivid expression in Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United
States:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be
let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.112
All that being said, the right to be let alone did not gain substantial
traction in constitutional thought until after World War II.113 Indeed, earlier
cases had been generally abysmal with regard to individual autonomy and
dignity, as can be no better demonstrated than by Justice Holmes’ infamous
1927 opinion in Buck v. Bell regarding the necessary sterilization of
"imbeciles."114
Although there were some fits and starts, the crucial break in the
constitutional levee came in the landmark case of Griswold v.
Connecticut.115 In Griswold, the Court located a constitutional right to
privacy within the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.116 Suffice it to say that
CRITICS 118, 131 (1969).
111
See Secunda, supra note 40, at 118 and n.2 (discussing JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., Norton Critical Editions 1975) (1859)).
112
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
113
As one indicia of its increasing presence, the "right to be let alone"
language was utilized only three times prior to 1946, but forty-three times
since according to a recent Westlaw query.
114
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding compulsory
sterilization legislation as constitutional, stating that, "[t]hree generations of
imbeciles are enough").
115
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
116
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 ("The foregoing cases suggest that
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.").
See also id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (locating the right to privacy
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this case's recognition of constitutionally-recognized zones of privacy,
unhinged from any one constitutional anchor, dramatically changed the
Court's orientation concerning individual rights to be free from arbitrary
government interference.117 Although Griswold itself only struck down
anti-contraception laws for married couples,118 its greater import derived
from its rooting the right to be let alone within the very structure and fiber
of the Federal Constitution.119
Consequently, it could not be considered surprising when, thereafter, the
right recognized in Griswold was extended to some non-married individuals
in Eisenstadt v. Baird120 and to additional individuals under the age of 16 in
Carey v. Population Services International.121 And not only was this zone
of privacy found to exist in the sacred quarters of the marital bedroom,122 it
was also decisively extended to more transcendental spheres with the
recognition of a woman's right to choose whether to terminate her
pregnancy in Roe v. Wade.123 Indeed, Roe decisively located these rights
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of certain fundamental rights to the
people); and id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding the privacy right as
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty") (citing Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 60506 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (maintaining that there is no general
right to privacy in the United States Constitution).
117
See Robert Misner, Minimalism, Desuetude, and Fornication, 35
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1999) (discussing the impact of the
Griswold decision on constitutional privacy law).
118
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
119
Id. at 485 ("The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees.").
120
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
121
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
122
For a discussion of the importance of the conception of the home to
historical constitutional privacy jurisprudence pre-Lawrence, see discussion
infra note 165 and accompanying text. See also Marc Stein, Boutilier and
the U.S. Supreme Court's Sexual Revolution, 23 LAW & HISTORY REV. 491,
535 (2005) (maintaining that based on its rulings from 1965 to 1973, "the
[United States Supreme] Court's vision of sexual citizenship was not
libertarian or egalitarian . . . [, but] was based on a doctrine that privileged
adult, heterosexual, monogamous, marital, familial, domestic, private, and
procreative forms of sexual expression.").
123
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ("[A] right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
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within the liberty interest contained in the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments.124
2. The Right to Personhood: Individuality, Dignity, and Autonomy
But the Court has not only sought to describe an individual's right to be
free from arbitrary government interference by merely relying upon Justice
Brandeis' vivid language in Olmstead concerning the "right to be let alone."
It has also done so in those substantive due process cases which see the
essence of this right revolving around personhood, or more specifically, as
involving themes of individuality, dignity, and autonomy.125 As Solove has
explained, basing privacy on conceptions of personhood differs from other
conceptions of privacy because personhood conceptions focus on the
normative good "of the protection of the integrity of the personality."126
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Carey, and Roe all have at their core this conception
of privacy.127 In a similar vein, in Whalen v. Roe, the Court emphatically
Constitution.").
124
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. In line with locating these rights within
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, Justice Harlan
famously wrote in another case:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This
'liberty' is not a series of isolated points picked out in terms of
the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion;
the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum
which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . and which
also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must,
that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the
state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
125
See Solove, supra note 103, at 1116-1119.
126
Id. at 1116.
127
Id. at 1117 ("[T]hese cases involved decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing.").
Indeed, this line of substantive due process cases pre-dates even the
Olmstead dissent. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding that the interest of parents in
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stated that the government is not free to interfere with an individual’s
fundamental life decisions without sufficient justification.128
Perhaps the most "elegant encapsulation"129 of this view of privacy as
personhood was captured by the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Souter,
and Kennedy in the pivotal 1992 case of Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.130 In the now famous "sweet-mysteryof-life" passage, derided by Justice Scalia and other commentators,131 these
three Justices found that:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.132
being able to send their children to private school to inhere within
substantive due process); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(holding that the Constitution's protection of liberty encompasses the
interest of parents in having their children learn German).
128
See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600; see also Solove, supra note 103, at
1117 ("[T]he Court has conceptualized the protection of privacy as the
state's non-interference in certain decisions that are essential in defining
personhood.").
129
See Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83
N.C. L. REV. 621, 655-656 (2005) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
130
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
131
For examples of Justice Scalia's and other commentators distaste of
this phrasing, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Dwight G. Duncan, The Federal Marriage
Amendment and Rule By Judges, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 543 (2004);
James E. Fleming, Lawrence's Republic, 39 TULSA L. REV. 563 (2004); see
also Toone, supra note 129, at 655-656 (remarking that Justice Scalia's
derision notwithstanding, many have found the 'right to define one's own
concept of existence' formulation to be valuable).
132
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (Joint Opinion of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter) (emphasis added). It is significant to note that the
Casey joint opinion did not receive majority support in placing this type of
all-encompassing liberty squarely within the substantive component of the
due process clauses. Indeed, this conception based on individual autonomy
and dignity remained a minority view of the Court until Lawrence. See
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Nevertheless, prior to Lawrence, the scope of the personhood rights
recognized by the joint opinion in Casey appeared to be largely limited by
the "history and tradition" test of Washington v. Glucksberg, a case dealing
with the right to physician-assisted suicide.133 There, the Court appeared to
draw back from the broad conception of individual liberty from
governmental interference set forth by the Casey plurality. In Glucksberg,
the Court found that the State of Washington's ban on assisted suicide did
not violate the due process rights of individuals because such laws were
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.134 In denying that
such laws interfered with the fundamental rights of individuals, the Court
employed a substantive due process analysis which considered whether
there was a careful description of an asserted right that was one of "those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in the
Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."135
Finding that such a right to physician-assisted suicide was not so enshrined
in our nation's history, the Court found there was no fundamental right to
assisted suicide under due process and upheld the Washington ban of
physician-assisted suicide under rational basis review.136 Consequently, as
late as 1997, far from embracing the comprehensive notion of individual
liberty to be free from governmental interference embodied by Casey, the
Supreme Court in Glucksberg appeared to be in the process of substantially
narrowing the scope of its substantive due process jurisprudence.137

Secunda, supra note 40, at 135 n.84.
133
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
134
Id. at 733.
135
Id. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted).
136
Id. at 721. As I have argued in a previous article, this stultifying
view of the contours of substantive due process has been criticized by
Justices and commentators as inconsistent with a broader and more
appropriate view of freedom from governmental interference. See Secunda,
supra note 40, at 129 n.52.
137
Accord Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process
Right to In Vitro Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2798 (2005)
("Glucksberg's 'careful description' test reflected the Court's tendency,
evinced in prior cases, toward narrow definition of the right in question as a
means of checking the expansion of the Court's substantive due process
jurisprudence.").
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3. The Right to Intimacy and Intimate Association
Closely connected to the right of personhood is the right to intimacy or
intimate association. Not only did the plurality in the "sweet-mystery-oflife" passage of Casey utilize the word "intimate" to assist in defining the
constitutional interests at stake,138 but almost a decade earlier in Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees,139 the Court recognized an important distinction between First
Amendment rights of expressive association140 and rights of intimate
association under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.141 The
latter rights recognize "that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure
individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain
kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary
from unjustified interference by the State."142 The Roberts Court defined a
central aspect of an individual's freedom from decisional non-interference in
private, intimate association as the ability to form and maintain human
bonds unmolested by the State, concluding that, "[p]rotecting these
[intimate] relationships from unwarranted state interference . . . safeguards
the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any
concept of liberty."143
Despite Roberts' strong endorsement of a right to intimate association,
138

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (Joint Opinion of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter).
139
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
140
For a discussion of the relationship between expressive association
and right to decisional non-interference in private affairs, see infra notes
229-230 and accompanying text. See also generally Daniel A. Farber,
Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and the First
Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483 (2001).
141
See id. at 618.
142
See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923));
and id. at 619 ("Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such
relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their
emotional enrichment from close ties with others."). The citation to these
older cases clearly places the freedom to intimate association within
substantive due process jurisprudence, rather than the First Amendment.
143
Id. at 619. Indeed, as Solove has explained, the important distinction
between the liberty of personhood versus the liberty of intimacy is the
difference between self-creation and autonomy on the one hand, and the
importance of human relationships to all individuals on the other. See
Solove, supra note 103, at 1121.

32

Paul M. Secunda

[31-Jan-06

prior to Lawrence, at least one significant Supreme Court case, Bowers v.
Hardwick,144 appeared to discount the importance of such human
relationships. Bowersheld, of cour se, that there is no constitutional right to
engage in homosexual sodomy.145 Through Justice White's narrow
conception of the individual interest involved in Bowers as pure sexual
gratification through the act of anal or oral intercourse in a homosexual
relationship, the Court limited the scope of the liberty interest found in the
Due Process Clause;146 that is, it failed to recognize that meaningful
personal relationships are necessarily made up of both sexual and nonsexual dimensions, all for the larger individual pursuit of happiness.147
Consequently, prior to June 2003, there was no comprehensive
conception of decisional autonomy in private affairs which recognized an
individual's right to self-definition, as well as his or her right to engage in
the process of self-definition through the development of personal
relationships with others. And to the extent that such a right to decisional
non-interference in private affairs was recognized, as it was in the 1977 case
of Whalen v. Roe,148 it did not seem to be afforded any type of heightened
protection from governmental incursions. Finally, although this type of
liberty interest has been recognized to some degree in past Supreme Court
cases, the Court continued to struggle to define the more esoteric and nonmaterial aspects of these liberty interests.
B. Lawrence v. Texas and the Fulfillment of Olmstead’s Legacy
The Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas149 greatly changed
the substantive due process jurisprudential landscape. Lawrence's central
holding, that the Texas sodomy statute at issue furthered no legitimate state
interest which could justify its intrusion into the personal and private lives
144

478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
145
Id. at 190-91.
146
See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1032 (denominating Justice White's
opinion for the Court "brusque" and "limit[ing] the Court's previous privacy
precedents to situations unique to heterosexual couples (marriage,
procreation, family).").
147
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) ("The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.").
148
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
149
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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of the individuals therein,150 was the first time a majority of the Supreme
Court unabashedly accepted in one case a conception of liberty that
included an individual's rights to be let alone, to personhood, and to
intimacy.151 In particular, by expressly overruling Bowers152 and, to a lesser
extent, by failing to even mention Glucksberg as binding precedent,153 the
Supreme Court put forward a novel type of substantive due process
analysis.154 Even though Lawrence clearly relied on Griswold, Roe, and
Casey, in coming to its conclusion,155 the key additional step taken by
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence was to recognize a transcendental,
non-material aspect to these types of liberty interests, consistent with the
Olmstead and Poe dissents of bygone days.156
150

Id. at 578. See also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1056 (reading the
underlying message of Lawrence and Romer as: "The state cannot create a
pariah class of useful, productive citizens and deny them a broad range of
legal rights and protections simply because their presumed private activities
are disgusting to other citizens.").
151
Although a similar conception of decisional autonomy in private
affairs was considered in Casey, it was not adopted by a majority of the
court. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
152
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
153
See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right
That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004)
(maintaining that “the [Lawrence] Court gave short shrift to the notion that
it was under some obligation to confine its implementation of substantive
due process to the largely mechanical exercise of isolating ‘fundamental
rights’ as though they were a historically given set of data points on a two
dimensional grid.”).
154
Accord Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term, Foreword:
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 97 (2003) ("Themes of respect and stigma are at the moral center of
the Lawrence opinion, and they are entirely new to substantive due process
doctrine.").
155
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66. See also Eskridge, supra note 15, at
1012 ("Once cannot interpret or apply Lawrence without situating it in
history.").
156
See id. at 562 ("Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty
of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.").
See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
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My purpose here, however, is not to undertake an extensive analysis of
what Lawrence does and does not hold. I have already weighed in on that
debate,157 and it will no doubt continue to percolate, at least until the
Supreme Court takes another case discussing the scope of its Lawrence
holding.158 Rather, my enterprise in this section is much more modest. I
merely wish to emphasize a point on which most commentators on all sides
of the debate seem to agree; that is, Lawrence attaches some form of
heightened review when the government seeks to interfere with the private
and personal lives of individuals.159 Although it is true that various forms
dissenting).
157
See Secunda, supra note 40, at 125-136 (maintaining that Lawrence
court applied a rational review with bite scrutiny in overturning the Texas
sodomy statute); accord State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 30, 34 (Kan. 2005)
(finding that the Lawrence majority, by discussing the equal protection
analysis in Romer and by discussing the inevitably linked nature of equal
protection and due process analysis in cases such as these, “at least implied
that the rational basis test is the appropriate standard.”).
158
See Secunda, supra note 40, at 162.
159
See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, An "Other" Christian Perspective on
Lawrence, 45 J. CATH. LEG. STUDS. (forthcoming 2006) (on file with
author) (finding that the Lawrence Court’s use of "rational basis" refers to
"rational basis with bite" because the evidence in the case suggests
irrational discrimination or animus) (citing Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-24 (1972)); Marybeth Herald, A
Bedroom of One's Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy After Lawrence v.
Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 29-32 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence is
an "elegant discourse on individual autonomy and liberty" and that some
form of heightened review is involved); Nan D. Hunter, Symposium: Gay
Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, Living With Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1103, 1104 (2004) (reading Lawrence to extend meaningful constitutional
protection to liberty interests without denominating them fundamental
rights); Martin A. Schwartz, Constitutional Basis of "Lawrence v. Texas,”
10/14/2003 N.Y.L.J. 3 (col. 1) (concluding that the Lawrence Court relied
on "important low-level scrutiny”); id. (describing Professor Dorf's
argument that Justice Kennedy's reliance on decisions like Griswold and
Roe, may imply that the court intended some form of heightened scrutiny);
and Tribe, supra note 153, at 1899 (arguing that the Court in Lawrence
“implicitly reject[ed] the notion that its task was simply to name the specific
activities textually or historically treated as protected,” and treated the
doctrine of substantive due process as reflecting “a deeper pattern involving
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of heightened scrutiny, including strict scrutiny, have been applied in the
past with regard to specific rights within the context of the rights to be let
alone, to personhood, and to intimate association, this article makes the
crucial point that Lawrence represents the first time a majority of the Court
has recognized a comprehensive preferred interest in decisional noninterference in private affairs.160 And as a preferred interest, governmental
infringements of an individual’s interests in decisional non-interference in
private affairs must involve the balancing of governmental efficiency
concerns against an individual’s interest in being free from governmental
interference in her personal and private life.161 Indeed, this is the very same
balancing test that the Court has already utilized throughout its
unconstitutional conditions in employment cases.162
Therefore, until disavowed by a subsequent Supreme Court decision,
Lawrence stands, at the very least, for an analytical approach that requires a
heightened form of judicial scrutiny whenever the government seeks to
interfere with the private and personal decisions of adult individuals.163 In
the allocation of decisionmaking roles.”); See also Dale Carpenter,
Symposium: Gay Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, Is Lawrence Libertarian,
88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1155 (2004) (interpreting Lawrence to hold that the
right to private, intimate association is a fundamental right); and Williams
v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Lawrence denominated a fundamental right to
sexual privacy); and State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24, 29 (Kan. 2005)
(applying Lawrence and reading it as applying a heightened form of rational
basis review, rather than a strict scrutiny analysis reserved for fundamental
rights or suspect classifications, in a case involving Kansas’ criminal
Romeo and Juliet statute, which contained differential penalties for
heterosexual and homosexual statutory rape).
160
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("Their right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government. 'It is a promise of the Constitution that there
is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.''')
(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847). See also Stein, supra note 122, at 536
("[I]n Lawrence[,] the Court struck down state sodomy laws, reinterpreting
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe in ways that reject . . . the earlier Court's
view that there is no right to engage in sex outside of marriage.").
161
See Secunda, supra note 40, at 136-138.
162
See supra Part II.B.2.
163
At the same time, Lawrence is equally clear concerning what it does
not touch upon:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
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other words, Lawrence "presumes an autonomy of self,"164 with the
government’s having to put forward a legitimate and substantial interest to
interfere with the personal and private decisional conduct of individuals.165
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does
not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Thus, cases involving kids, prostitution, and
drugs are generally not covered by the rights described in Lawrence. But
see State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24, 29 (Kan. 2005) (finding that Kansas’
criminal Romeo and Juliet statute, which contained differential penalties for
heterosexual and homosexual statutory rape, lacked a rational basis under
the guidance of Lawrence).
164
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
165
Unlike some other commentators, I do not believe the right described
by Lawrence is limited to private conduct that takes place in the sanctity of
the home. See Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence
v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400-01 (2004) (arguing that
Lawrence relies on narrow version of liberty that is both "geographized and
domesticated"). Although Lawrence derives from cases where home and
sex play a large role, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?”); and Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“Moreover, in the context of this case a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy
of a person's own home- that right takes on an added dimension. For also
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.”), Lawrence is
more in the tradition of Olmstead and the joint opinion in Casey in
describing a liberty interest which is transcendental and non-material in its
dimensions. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“The instant case involves
liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.)
(emphasis added); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992) (joint opinion) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life.”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The [founding fathers] knew that only a
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations.”).
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As a result, the right to decisional non-interference in private affairs may
now take its rightful place next to other "preferred" constitutional interests,
and, when infringed in relation to the granting of government benefits, must
be analyzed under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The next
section contends that this constitutional development in the area of
substantive due process requires nothing less than a reformulation of the
appropriate unconstitutional conditions test to protect these emerging
constitutional interests.
IV. THE IMPACT OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS ON THE DOCTRINE OF
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
As previously illustrated, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine had
been limited by and large to First Amendment considerations.166 Now, after
Lawrence, there is a new type of constitutional liberty interest: the interest
in decisional non-interference in private affairs, which is subject to some
form of heightened judicial review. As a result, public employers should
have to show legitimate and substantial interests before interfering with the
personal and private lives of their employees. The next two sections
elaborate on the inadequacy of the current First Amendment
Connick/Pickering analysis for vindicating these public employee interests
in decisional non-interference and, in its stead, propose a modified
Pickering test, which is consistent with other constitutional tests utilized to
protect the constitutional interests of public employees.
A.
The Incongruence Between the Interest in Decisional NonInterference in Private Affairs and the Connick/Pickering Analysis
Quite simply put, the current First Amendment model for public
employee speech rights is inadequate to vindicate the interests of
individuals in decisional non-interference in private affairs because of the
public concern test. As set out above, the current Connick/Pickering
analysis requires at the threshold that a court consider whether the public
employee is speaking out on a matter of public concern.167 Needless to say,
these same concerns normally do not justify a public concern test in the
post-Lawrence substantive due process rights context. Here, the issue is
not the ability of the public employees to speak out or express themselves
on pressing social, political, or communal issues,168 but, quite to the
166

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.B.2.
168
See Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) ("When employee expression
167
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contrary, it is the ability to retain a modicum of autonomy and personal
space without jeopardizing one's public employment. In this regard, a case
in which a public employer seeks to make a female employee marry her
live-in boyfriend or else face discharge from her job does not implicate any
real First Amendment rights. Consequently, the test for post-Lawrence
substantive due process rights envisioned here does not include the public
concern test.169
This is not to say that there might not be the rare case in which a public
employee will be able to call upon both her First Amendment expression
rights and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. This is
because there could be instances where an employee is both seeking to
express herself on a matter of public concern, while at the same time
seeking a measure of personal space for her private conduct.170 For an
cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide
latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.").
169
Some may argue that something like a threshold test for Lawrence
right cases is needed to properly take into account the increased leeway that
government has in its employer capacity. Nonetheless, not all constitutional
balancing tests have a threshold test like the public concern test; indeed, the
privacy interests of public employees under the Fourth Amendment have
been subjected to a balancing test without the use of any gate-keeping or
threshold test. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
616-618 (1989); Knox County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ.,
158 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1998).
170
It would appear that if one had the choice of frameworks, one might
choose the Connick/Pickering line of cases since these cases recognize that
political speech is at the heart of the First Amendment. See Connick, 461
U.S. at 145 (“The explanation for the Constitution's special concern with
threats to the right of citizens to participate in political affairs is no mystery.
The First Amendment ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.’”) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); and
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)). On the other hand,
although this article maintains that there is a heightened interest
surrounding the right to decisional non-interference in private affairs after
Lawrence, the relative importance of these rights on the constitutional
spectrum still remains to be determined and thus, is almost certainly not at
the level of political speech rights.
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example of one of these rare cases, consider the NAMBLA case,171 which
concerned the rights of a public school teacher pedophile to advocate on his
free time for the legalization of man-boy sexual relationships.172 Not only
were his First Amendment free speech rights at issue under
Connick/Pickering,173 but one could argue that his interest in decisional
non-interference in private affairs might have also been at stake, as long as
he was not seeking to commit the criminal act of child molestation.174 On
the other hand, there would appear to be abundant factual scenarios under
which interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs will be the
only way to vindicate a public employee's constitutional rights.175
In short, the point of this brief section is merely to make evident what
may already be obvious to many. An employee's interest in decisional noninterference by her employer may infrequently be synonymous with that
employee's First Amendment rights. Nevertheless, there is a substantially
larger category of cases in which the employee will only be able to depend
on an interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs. It is these
171

See Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1183 (2004). NAMBLA refers to the "North American
Man/Boy Love Association."
172
See id. at 189.
173
Indeed, the NAMBLA member, Mr. Melzer, lost his case under the
Connick/Pickering analysis. See id. at 199.
174
To be clear, this analysis assumes, as the court did, that Mr. Melzer
did not base his claim on the right to engage in criminal pedophilia. See id.
at 189 ("[T]he record before us reveals no evidence that plaintiff engaged in
any illegal or inappropriate conduct at [his public school]. Plaintiff's outlet
as a pedophile is his participation in NAMBLA, which he joined in 1979 or
1980 to discuss with others his long-standing attraction to young boys."). If
Mr. Melzer had engaged in such criminal conduct away from work, his
actions would not be saved by his heightened substantive due process under
Lawrence. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not
involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced
or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused.”).
175
Some common examples would include instances in which public
employees were terminated from their jobs for having a live-in boyfriend,
being gay, for seeking an abortion, or for using contraception. Other
examples might include instances in which a public employee is fired for
visiting a gay bar, participating in an adult internet chat room, or for
engaging in even more risqué off-duty conduct. See infra discussion Part
V.B.
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cases which require a reconstructed doctrinal model to vindicate these postLawrence substantive due process rights.
B.

A New Model: The Modified Pickering Analysis

1. The Basics
Even without the public concern test of Connick, the Pickering
balancing test must be altered to meet the decisional autonomy concerns of
public employees. As presently stated, the test balances the interests of the
employee as citizen in speaking out on matters of public concern and the
interest of the state as employer in running an efficient government
service.176 The state's interests in this regard generally remain the same177
and more specifically include the government's interest in having loyal
subordinates, in having co-workers who can work together, in maintaining a
favorable public image in the community, and in fulfilling its public
mission.178
On the other side of the ledger, the employee's interests need to be
substantially redefined. The emphasis is no longer on the ability of the
employee-citizens to speak out or express themselves on matters of public
concern. Instead, the issue is being free from unwanted governmental
intrusions with respect to decisions relating to matters concerning one's
private and personal life.179 Specifically, a government employee should be
able "to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusions into [his or her] privacy."180 Moreover, there
should be a "zone of autonomy, of presumptive immunity to governmental
176

See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
See Solove, supra note 14, at 2 (observing that the governmental
interests in such balancing tests "are often much more readily articulated.").
178
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-73). As Kozel has perceptively argued,
Pickering is really about an employee not engaging in speech or conduct
which causes a substantial disruption to the employer. See Kozel, supra
note 79, at 1019 ("The Pickering/Connick doctrine collapses into little more
than the constitutionalization of a heckler's veto."); see also Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 1969) (also relying upon
"substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities" in
regulating the political speech of students in school).
179
See Solove, supra note 14, at 55.
180
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (discussing privacy
rights in the First Amendment context).
177
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regulation."181 As such, anytime the government as employer seeks to
justify an intrusion into an employee's sacrosanct zone of decisional noninterference, a legitimate and substantial justification must be set forth.182
Thus, the modified Pickering balancing test for public employees'
substantive due process rights should balance the employee’s interest as
citizen in being free from unwanted and unjustified governmental intrusions
in the employee's personal and private life against the government's interest
as employer in running an efficient governmental service for the benefit of
the public.183 At times, this balance will obviously be strongly in favor of
either the government or the employee, depending on whether the
employee's off-duty actions have any impact on the employer. If there is no
impact, analogizing to the Court's conclusion in NTEU,184 the employee's
interests will normally prevail.185 Also, easy cases will involve instances in
which the employee is engaging in a certain line of private conduct
explicitly not protected by Lawrence, such as cases involving minors or
commercial conduct such as prostitution.186
But the more numerous and difficult cases will fall somewhere in
between these antipodes. For these more intricate cases, it is helpful to
consider the "nexus test" used for employee discharges by labor arbitrators
in the union environment. As described elsewhere,187 the general principle
is that an employer should not be able to interfere with an employee's life
outside of work unless there is more than a de minimis adverse impact on
181

See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410,
1411 (1974).
182
See supra note 26.
183
To reiterate, even though the Pickering case analogy is utilized to
label this test, the modified Pickering analysis would only apply to
constitutional balancing of employees' substantive due process rights and
government employers' efficiency concerns, not to First Amendment cases
concerning freedom of speech, expression, or association. See supra note
19.
184
See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513
U.S. 454 (1995).
185
See id. at 465 ("Neither the character of the authors, the subject
matter of their expression, the effect of the content of their expression on
their official duties, nor the kind of audiences they address have any
relevance to their employment.").
186
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
187
See Paul M. Secunda, Getting to the Nexus of the Matter: A Sliding
Scale Approach to Faculty-Student Consensual Relationship Policies in
Higher Education, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55, 68-73 (2004).
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the employer's work place.188 This impact can be measured based on the
detriment to the employer's public image, the inability of the worker to
interact with her co-employees, or the simple inability of the employee to
carry out the essential functions of her position as a result of her private
conduct.189 But outside of these types of legitimate and substantial
justifications for interference in an employee's private life, a government
employer should be constrained by the liberty interest contained in the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments from interfering with the personal and private lives
of their employees.
2. The Coherency Between the Modified Pickering Test and Other
Constitutional Protections Afforded Public Employees
In establishing this modified Pickering analysis to protect the interests
of public employees in decisional non-interference in private affairs, this
article by no means draws upon a blank slate. Instead, it takes its cues
directly from other areas of constitutional law in which the constitutional
rights of public employees are also at stake.
In this regard, one needs look no further for an apt analogy than cases
concerning the permissibility of drug testing public employees.190 Although
188

See id. at 69; see also Kozel, supra note 79, at 1051 (noting that the
Supreme Court has made a distinction in public employee speech cases
based on whether the speech or expression in question included any indicia
of the speaker's employment).
189
See id. at 70 (citing W.E. Caldwell Co., 28 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
434, 436-37 (1957) (Kesselman, Arb.)). Compare Bd. of County Comm’rs
v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) ("The government needs to be free to
terminate both employees and contractors for poor performance, to improve
the efficiency, efficacy, and responsiveness of service to the public, and to
prevent the appearance of corruption."); and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[T]he Government's interest is
the maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline . . . To this end, the
Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over
the management of its personnel and internal affairs.").
190
See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656 (1989) (permitting suspicionless drug search of federal Custom agents);
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-618 (1989)
(upholding federal regulations requiring employees of private railroads to
produce urine samples for drug testing upon the occurrence of an accident);
Knox County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361 (6th

31-Jan-06]

The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence

43

these cases involve a Fourth Amendment analysis regarding the
reasonableness of the search and seizure involved,191 many of the same
concerns which have animated the discussion in this paper are also apparent
in the Fourth Amendment context.
For example, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the
question presented was whether federal custom agents could be subjected to
drug urinalysis testing as a condition of their being promoted or
transferred.192 Using the administrative search criterion and the "special
needs" test under the Fourth Amendment,193 the court engaged in a
constitutional balancing test based on a standard of reasonableness,194
Cir. 1998) (permitting the drug testing of public school teachers), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 812 (1999). But cf. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305
(1997) (striking down drug testing requirements for candidates for high
public office in Georgia).
191
See U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and
seizure, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."). The Supreme Court has already settled that the Fourth
Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by
the government, even when the government acts as an employer. See
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (plurality opinion).
192
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 659.
193
Although a government search must normally be supported by a
warrant issued upon probable cause, see, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 873 (1987), neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor any
measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of
reasonableness in every circumstance. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 342, n. 8, (1985); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556561 (1976). In administrative searches, for instance, the government is able
to proceed without a search warrant when the "special needs" of the search
so require. See, e.g., Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722 (the need of an employer to
enter an employee's office, desk, or files comprises "special need" and no
warrant is required); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41 (finding warrant
requirement unsuited to school context because it unduly interferes with the
maintenance of swift and informal disciplinary procedures).
194
"Where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to
balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's
interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some
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noting that the immediacy of the government's concern and the minimal
nature of the intrusion outweighed the individual's interest in privacy and
permitted the government to undertake drug testing of the custom agents.195
The importance in ensuring that these federal employees were drug free was
paramount because these custom officers carried guns and interdicted
drugs.196
Similarly, in the context of substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a comparable, finely attuned balancing of interests
test could be applied. As in Von Raab, the context of the employee's job
should be given substantial weight in determining the justification of an
intrusion.197 For instance, police officers and other public officials that deal
with guns and other sensitive information could be subjected to more
intrusive searches than, say, your average civilian clerk for a
municipality.198 On the other hand, just because an employee is employed
by law enforcement, does not mean that the employer, especially after
Lawrence, should dictate every aspect of how that employee chooses to live
her private life.199 In fact, Lawrence itself makes clear that the morality of
level of individualized suspicion in the particular context." Skinner, 489
U.S. at 619-20.
195
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677 ("In sum, we believe the Government has
demonstrated that its compelling interests in safeguarding our borders and
the public safety outweigh the privacy expectations of employees who seek
to be promoted to positions that directly involve the interdiction of illegal
drugs or that require the incumbent to carry a firearm.").
196
See id. at 672 ("We think Customs employees who are directly
involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry
firearms in the line of duty likewise have a diminished expectation of
privacy in respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test.").
197
See id. at 671 ("[I]t is plain that certain forms of public employment
may diminish privacy expectations even with respect to such personal
searches.").
198
Accord id. at 671 ("Employees of the United States Mint, for
example, should expect to be subject to certain routine personal searches
when they leave the workplace every day. Similarly, those who join our
military or intelligence services may not only be required to give what in
other contexts might be viewed as extraordinary assurances of
trustworthiness and probity, but also may expect intrusive inquiries into
their physical fitness for those special positions.").
199
See Hartsoe, supra note 91, at A06 (describing actions of North
Carolina sheriff in forcing a dispatcher to choose between her job and living
together with her boyfriend).
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one's employer will generally not be sufficient to outweigh the substantial
interests an employee has in making important life decisions unrestricted by
governmental interference.200
In short, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence surrounding drug
testing of public employees lends support to the modified Pickering
analysis articulated in this paper.
V.
APPLYING THE MODIFIED PICKERING TEST: OF
PORNOGRAPHIC POLICEMAN, SWINGING SCHOOL TEACHERS, AND
SALACIOUS SHERIFF DISPATCHERS
So how will this modified Pickering balance actually work in practice?
In order to see how this new analysis would play out in a real world case,
one only has to look at the case of the pornographic policeman. Therefore,
the first section of this Part asks whether this new test would have made any
difference in the outcome of City of San Diego v. Roe. Concluding that the
outcome of this case would most likely have been the same, the second
section nevertheless predicts that the ascendancy of public employees'
interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs post-Lawrence will
greatly increase their protection from illegitimate and arbitrary interference
into their private and personal lives by their government employers.
A.

Of Pornographic Policemen

1. Applying the Connick/Pickering First Amendment Analysis
To jog the memory of the reader, the case of the pornographic
policeman in San Diego v. Roe201 involved whether John Roe could engage
in pornographic activities outside of his police work.202 The Supreme Court
carried out a straightforward First Amendment Connick/Pickering
analysis.203 More specifically, the Court came to the conclusion that John
200

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-578 (upholding Justice Steven's view
in his Bowersdissent that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.").
201
125 S. Ct. 521 (2004) (per curiam).
202
See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
203
In applying the Connick/Pickering analysis to this case, the Court
found that the NTEU case does not stand for the proposition that, "off-thejob, non-employment related speech should generally merit strong
protection under the Pickering balancing test." See Kozel, supra note 79, at
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Roe's conduct did not deserve First Amendment protection under either the
NTEU or Connick/Pickering line of cases.204
Under NTEU, involving the honoraria ban for federal employees, the
Court observed that even if one were to concede that John Roe was
speaking on a matter of public concern, which he was not, NTEU was not
the appropriate precedent.205 That is because the speech and expression of
the federal employees in NTEU had absolutely nothing to do with their
federal employment.206 Of course, it goes without saying that under such
circumstances, the balance between government interests and employee
interests swings wildly in favor of the employee. On the other hand, John
Roe unstintingly attempted to take advantage of his status as a law
enforcement officer to pad his own pocket through pornographic activities.
For instance, not only was John Roe selling old San Diego police uniforms
on eBay,207 but he listed in his personal profile online that he was
"employed in the field of law enforcement."208 Also, and quite damningly,
the pornographic tape that he unwittingly sold to an undercover detective
depicted him in a non-affiliated police uniform engaging in police activities
and sex acts at the same time.209 Finally, even though John Roe used a fake
AOL account name and did not disclose his name on eBay (going so far to
set up a private mailbox for his pornographic business in northern
California),210 nevertheless, he was readily identifiable by individuals who
1050. Instead, the John Roe Court foreclosed the idea that NTEU created a
presumption in favor of protecting off-duty speech or expression by
refusing to apply NTEU to the facts of John Roe. See John Roe, 125 S. Ct.
at 524. The important distinction between the two cases is that NTEU
involved speech on matters of public concern while John Roe clearly did
not. See id.
204
See id. at 523-24.
205
See id. at 524 ("The present case falls outside the protection afforded
in NTEU.").
206
See id. ("The Court [in NTEU] . . . observed that none of the speech
at issue 'even arguably [had] any adverse impact' on the employer.")
(quoting NTEU, 513 U.S. at 465).
207
See id. at 523.
208
Id.
209
See id. In particular, the video in question showed Roe, initially in
police uniform, issuing a traffic ticket, only to revoke it after stripping and
masturbating in front of the ticketed driver. See id.
210
See John Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 522; San Diego v. Roe, NO. 03-1669,
2004 WL 1877785, at *2 (U.S. Aug. 17, 2004) (Brief in Opposition to
Petition for Certiorari).
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worked with him (including the sergeant who reported him).211
Moreover, and as the John Roe Court actually held, John Roe's conduct
clearly did not "qualify as a matter of public concern under any view of the
public concern test."212 Thus, under both NTEU and Connick/Pickering, the
per curiam decision was rightly decided under the First Amendment.
2. Applying the Modified Pickering Test to John Roe’s Substantive Due
Process Rights
What if the Court had considered John Roe's interest in decisional noninterference in private affairs?213 Would the case have had a different
outcome? Most likely not. Although there would have been some obvious
differences in the analysis,214 the problem with the John Roe case under the
modified Pickering analysis is similar to those endemic to any type of
constitutional balancing test: the more unpopular or disruptive the public
employee's off-duty conduct to the employer's workplace, the more likely
that the Pickering balance will favor the employer's efficiency interests.215
Because the knowledge of John Roe's off-duty pornographic conduct would
have caused a significant disruption in the San Diego police department, it
is likely that any interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs
that John Roe had would have been outweighed by the legitimate and
substantial efficiency interests of his employer.216
211

See Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 523.
See id. at 526.
213
John Roe filed his complaint in the Southern District of California on
September 28, 2001. See San Diego v. Roe, NO. 03-1669, 2004 WL
1378662, at *4 (U.S. Jun. 17, 2004) (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing
in support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari). Consequently, John Roe's
attorney did not have Lawrence-based arguments at his disposal initially
and would have been foreclosed from brining up any such new legal
theories of recovery for the first time on appeal.
214
Most obviously, John Roe would not have been thrown out of court
on the relatively easy ground that his conduct was not within the traditional
realm of public concern. Moreover, rather than focusing on speech rights
under the First Amendment, the Court under the proposed test would have
had to instead focus on John Roe's rights to decisional non-interference in
private affairs.
215
See Kozel, supra note 79, at 1018-1019.
216
John Roe is even a less sympathetic plaintiff because he
transparently attempted to use the fact of his police department employment
to his private advantage and to his employer's detriment. See John Roe, 125
212
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Perhaps even more importantly, the John Roe facts differ from the
substantive due process rights upheld in Lawrence in at least four important
ways. First, the conduct in question did not occur in the privacy of John
Roe's home.217 The Supreme Court appears to be most comfortable
upholding liberty interests under substantive due process when the privacy
of the home is involved.218 Second, producing the type of pornography that
John Roe produced does not involve engaging in an intimate, sexual
relationship as part of forging a meaningful human relationship as the
Lawrence case did.219 Third, law enforcement officers, because of the
nature of their responsibilities, are given far less leeway in their off-duty
conduct than other types of government workers.220 Finally, John Roe's
conduct in producing and distributing the pornographic videotapes was both
public and commercial at the same time and therefore, unlikely even to be
covered by the interests recognized in Lawrence.221
In short, John Roe would have most likely lost his case even if his
interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs had been taken into
account under a modified Pickering test. This is because, as demonstrated
above, the government's efficiency concerns would remain at a high level,
and, if anything, John Roe's interest in decisional non-interference in private
S. Ct. at 526.
217
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has placed
significant emphasis on whether conduct was engaged in by individuals in
the privacy of their home. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
218
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)
("Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.");
see also Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (finding that
constitutional "privacy right encompasses and protects the personal
intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and
child rearing."). See also Stein, supra note 122, at 535.
219
In pre-Lawrence terminology, the right to intimacy is lacking since
John Roe's conduct did not include the forging of the bonds of a personal
relationship. See supra discussion Part III.A.3.
220
See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976) ("[Law
enforcement] employer has, in accordance with its well-established duty to
keep the peace, placed myriad demands upon the members of the police
force, duties which have no counterpart with respect to the public at
large.").
221
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The present
case does not involve . . . public conduct or prostitution.).
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affairs would be minimal given the facts of the case.
B.

Of Swinging School Teachers and Salacious Sheriff Dispatchers

Nevertheless, just because our pornographic policeman does not benefit
from the doctrinal innovation introduced in this paper, it does not mean that
other public employees will not gain important, additional constitutional
protections which they currently do not have under the First Amendment
Connick/Pickering analysis. In order to discern the impact that these
interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs, and the modified
Pickering analysis, will have on public employees' substantive due process
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it is necessary to turn to
a consideration of a number of real world and hypothetical cases to flesh out
the contours of this analysis.
1. The Easier Cases Under the Modified Pickering Analysis: The Sheriff
Dispatcher
The easier cases under the modified Pickering analysis will involve
well-established privacy rights that public employees had pre-Lawrence.
For instance, an employer would run afoul of an employee’s interest in
decisional non-interference in private affairs if the employee discharged the
employee for using contraception or for having an abortion. 222 Now, postLawrence, easier cases should also include those in which someone is fired
for being homosexual or, for that matter, having any private relationships
between consenting adults that do not adversely impact the participants'
employment.223 The North Carolina cohabitation case currently being
222

These would be relatively straightforward unconstitutional
conditions cases because the government as employer would be seeking to
prevent indirectly, i.e., the use of contraception or abortion, which it could
not prevent directly through the conditioning of a government benefit, i.e.,
government employment. See Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1421-22
("Unconstitutional conditions problems arise when government offers a
benefit on condition that the recipient perform of forego an activity that a
preferred constitutional right normally protects from government
interference.").
223
Recall again the case in which a female attorney in the employ of the
infamous Mr. Bowers was fired for being a lesbian. See Shahar v. Bowers,
114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997). In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit was able to
uphold the discharge of that attorney under a very deferential rational basis
review analysis following the Bowers precedent. See id. at 1110-1111.
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litigated by the ACLU is another prime example.224 There, a female sheriff
dispatcher, who lived with her boyfriend, claimed that she was forced to
quit her job by the Sheriff when she would not either marry her boyfriend or
move out of the house.225 In support of his position, the Sheriff relied upon
an 1805 "adultery and fornication" statute which prohibited cohabitation of
unmarried persons.226 The pending lawsuit challenges the continuing
validity of such cohabitation statutes post-Lawrence.227
Because Lawrence itself deals with consensual sex between two
individuals in the privacy of their home,228 and because there are potential
criminal sanctions at stake for violating the cohabitation statute in
question,229 there can be little doubt that this case will be directly controlled
by reference to the substantive due process rights discussed in Lawrence. In
this vein, and in the language of the modified Pickering test, the
government employer cannot condition the benefit of public employment on
an employee’s sacrificing her right to engage in a private relationship,
especially when that relationship has no nexus to the employee's work
duties.230 Notice this would be true whether that relationship involved a
Post-Lawrence, a court's consideration of a public employee’s rights to
decisional non-interference in private affairs in future cases should make
firing for being homosexual or lesbian an illegitimate and arbitrary factor
upon which to base a discharge, and, in such cases, the modified Pickering
balance would come out in favor of the employee. Accord Eskridge, supra
note 15, at 1056 (arguing that, after Lawrence, a state cannot tell gay people
"that they are presumptive outlaws who can for that reason be denied civil
service employment, licenses, and various state benefits. Nor can the state
tell gay people that the price of citizenship for them is to remain in the
closet."); and id. at 1058 ("[M]ost of the state and local discriminations
explicitly targeting lesbian and gay citizens ought to be suspect after Romer
and Lawrence.").
224
See Hartsoe, supra note 91, at A06.
225
See id..
226
See id. The North Carolina "adultery and fornication" statue states:
"If any man and woman, not being married to each other, shall lewdly and
lasciviously associate, bed, and cohabit together, they shall be guilty of a
Class 2 misdemeanor." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2005).
227
See Hartsoe, supra note 91, at A06.
228
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (observing the “emerging awareness
that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”).
229
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184.
230
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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heterosexual or homosexual relationship, or for that matter, a married or
unmarried couple. Thus, under the modified Pickering analysis, because the
government’s interest in interfering with its employee's interest in
decisional non-interference in private affairs is not supported by a
legitimate or substantial justification outside of the state’s own moral
proclivities concerning unmarried men and women living together,231 the
government's efficiency interests would be clearly outweighed by the
individual's interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs.
2. The More Difficult Cases Under the Modified Pickering Analysis: The
Swinging School Teacher
Unfortunately, many of the future cases involving these interests in
decisional non-interference will not involve the easier type of scenarios
described in the previous section. Instead, the majority of these cases will
likely require a careful analysis of both the governmental interests in
efficiency and freedom from disruption on the one hand, and the strength of
the employee's post-Lawrence substantive due process rights on the other.
A few examples will suffice to establish some of the analytical intricacies
that will no doubt occur in these complicated cases.
For instance, consider the difficulties with any activity which a public
employee engages in on his private or personal time which brings great
notoriety to his employer.
In these cases, it is more likely that the
employee would lose any subsequent constitutional balancing, as the
disruption entailed by the employee's private conduct will likely
overshadow any interest in decisional non-interference that an employee
might have.232 In this regard, consider a police officer who in his spare time
is a porn star. Regardless of the nature of the employee interests involved,
the need to maintain the credibility of its police officers and its own
reputation will probably permit the employer to take constitutionally
permissible, adverse employment actions against that employee.233
231

Lawrence makes clear that the promotion of a majoritarian morality
is not a sufficient government interest to outweigh an individual's right to
freely exercise their rights to decisional non-interference in private affairs.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (adopting Justice
Steven's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick). See also Eskridge, supra note 15,
at 1045 (observing that the Court in Lawrence found that popular disgust of
homosexual sodomy could not supply the rational basis under the Due
Process Clause for making homosexual sodomy a crime).
232
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
233
See City of San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521, 526 (2004) (per
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Likewise, the same outcome would result in a case involving a public
elementary school teacher who is exposed publicly as engaging in a swinger
lifestyle outside of school. Because of the sensitive nature of the public
school teacher's position and the importance for these individuals to model
appropriate behavior for children,234 the efficiency concerns of the public
employer will most likely outweigh the decisional autonomy interests of the
teacher in these circumstances as well.
Consider another difficult set of facts. John Doe is still an employee
who is a police officer, and thus more highly regulated, but, unlike John
Roe, he does not engage in pornographic activities. Instead, he films
himself and his wife engaging in consensual sexual intercourse for their
private use, but unfortunately the videotape is stolen by an acquaintance and
ends up being distributed widely on the Internet. When the police
department learns of the tape and the adverse reaction the tape is causing in
the community, the police officer is fired. Under a modified Pickering
analysis, can this police officer be constitutionally discharged?
On the one hand, the carrying out of a personal relationship, especially
in the marital bedroom,235 is due much freedom from governmental
incursions.236 Moreover, the police officer did not wish for this tape to
become public and the tape became public through no efforts of his own.
On the other hand, regardless of the police officer's desire not to have this
videotape placed on the Internet, the fact of the matter is that it now exists
in cyberspace and the officer's credibility and that of his department are on
the line. If the police department can show substantial disruptions to its
operations and that a public safety issue has now arisen as a result of the
distractions caused by the scandal, the department will most likely be able
to discharge the officer. Nonetheless, this type of case will no doubt require
curiam) (stressing the importance of the impact of the public employee’s
private conduct on the “mission and functions” of the public employer in
this type of unconstitutional conditions analysis); and United States v. Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995) (observing
that that none of the speech at issue “even arguably [had] any adverse
impact on the employer.").
234
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Schs., 533 U.S. 98, 116
(2001) (observing "that students are susceptible to pressure in the
classroom, particularly given their possible reliance on teachers as role
models.") (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987)).
235
See supra note 165.
236
See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). See also discussion supra note
222 and accompanying text.
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a careful balancing by the court and may turn on such case-sensitive factors
as the size of the municipality, the extent of the public's knowledge of the
tape, and the type of sexual conduct displayed on the videotape.
Similarly, more difficult issues arise when a public employee acts as the
public face of the employer. This is because of the potential message the
employer is sending to the public by keeping the employee in employment
after the employee engages in the controversial conduct.237 For instance,
what if the police chief is caught engaging in an extramarital affair off-duty,
and this conduct is made public. Does the employer, for efficiency reasons,
have more latitude to terminate the chief, even though the chief would
appear to have post-Lawrence substantive due process rights to engage in
consensual sexual relations with another person on his own time?238 Does it
depend on the geographic location in which the scenario occurs and that
community’s mores? Perhaps, a police chief in a small, conservative town
would be discharged, while a police chief in a large, liberal metropolitan
city would face no adverse employment action. Should the constitutional
interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs be different in
different parts of the country?239 These are all very difficult questions
which will have to be weighed by the lower courts in deciding these
complex cases.
In short, there may sometimes be no clear-cut answers to the complex
questions posed by these post-Lawrence cases; nevertheless, public
employees are no doubt better off as a whole as a result of Lawrence and its
elevation of the right to decisional non-interference in private affairs to a
preferred constitutional liberty interest. To what extent public employees
237

See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) ("The
Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send one message but
not the other."). It is anything but clear if government institutions are
expressive associations, but even if they are not, the modified Pickering
analysis would still give credence to government efficiency concerns, which
would include the government employer’s right to maintain a certain image
or reputation within a community.
238
This scenario assumes there are no applicable statutory or common
law prohibitions against engaging in extra-marital relationships.
239
Such an outcome would place these cases in a category similar to
First Amendment obscenity cases in which courts utilize, in part, a
contemporary community standards test. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 24 (1973) (“The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest.”).

54

Paul M. Secunda

[31-Jan-06

are better off will depend to a large extent on how the lower federal courts
interpret the scope of these interests in the coming years. But at the very
least, Lawrence, with the aid of the modified Pickering test, should provide
much greater protection to public employees against arbitrary and
meddlesome government overreaching that unnecessarily treads into the
secret regions of their lives.
CONCLUSION
This paper argues that whatever debates continue to stew regarding the
"true" meaning of Lawrence v. Texas, at the very least, Lawrence represents
the recognition of an individual's heightened interest in decisional noninterference in private affairs.240 This is an important constitutional
development since a problem under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions only arises when the government offers a benefit, like
government employment, conditioned on the waiver of a preferred
constitutional right. Thus, a government employer, post-Lawrence, should
be prohibited under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions from firing a
government employee who exercises her interests in decisional noninterference in private affairs.
However, the current protections for public employee speech rights
under the Connick/Pickering analysis do not adequately safeguard these
emerging interests in decisional non-interference. The proposed modified
Pickering test discards the unnecessary “public concern test” for these postLawrence substantive due process cases and, in the first instance, balances
the employee’s interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs
against the government’s interest in operating an efficient governmental
service for the public. The upshot, and a much neglected impact of the
Lawrence decision, is that over twenty-one million federal, state, and local
United States’ employees should be the beneficiaries in coming years of a
significant expansion of their interests in being free from arbitrary and
capricious interference by their employers in their personal and private
lives.
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Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1012 ("[F]ew constitutional scholars
think the narrowest or the broadest reading of Lawrence is correct. Its
charged reasoning cannot be limited to the sodomy context alone, but
neither does it entail same-sex marriage.").

